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Junior from Kalamazoo, Michigan, Dottie Ca1tland skins Skinner and presents ..

THE FIGHT FOR FREE WILL
BY

DoTriE

CARTLAND

Conformity, cont1"0l, cultural enginem·ing-ambiguous words that
emerge again and again in convocation speeches and classroom discussions; sometimes regarded with patronizing benevolence, clothed
in "glittering generalities;" more often scorned, painted in blackest
hues, and posed as evil adversaries of the ever-combatant "Free
Will." Is it possible to analyze these concepts objectively, to examine them as neither bogies nor saviors of society? How important is their influence on the behavior and thinking of modern
man?
We are constantly reminded that the American people operate
en masse, that there is a growing b·eod toward conformity. No
longer can we find the "inner-directed" mao, whom David Reisman
described in The Lonely Crowd, one who is guided as by a personal
gyroscope. In his place we have the "other-directed" individual,
whose sole equipment for gaining experience is a set of antennae.
Thus he functions merely as a receiving set for group ideas. No
one likes to think of himself as a chameleon-like creatme who takes
on each changing shade of his environment. If we accept this
interpretation, we find omselves a sadly degenerate humanity!
Joseph Wood Krutch, in The Measure of Man, writes words of
hope to those of us who view with alarm the increasing obscmity
of human values. It is his contention that we need not sacrifice
om belief in the free will of mao. He launches a vigorous attack
on the materialistic system of thought devised by Freud, Marx, and
Darwin, and adopted by B. F. Skinner, twentieth centmy behaviorist
psychologist.
Members of our psychology department at Denison have allied
themselves with Skinner in maintaining that the concept of Free
Will merits careful re-examination. Current developments in the
science of the mind require us to take a realistic rather than an

. alistic view. On the basis of Dr. Skinner's textbook. A Science
deH man Behavior and his novel, Walden Two, I have attempte~
of umise how he would reply to the criticisms Krutch makes of his
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enIn his analysis of om so-called "Age of Anxiety," Krutch holds
the people of almost every period in history have had the same
that hondriacal tendency to think of tl1err
· own tim" es as more
hypOCbl d than those of previous generations. Psychologists might
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with that name for this age Wlth one reservation: at man IS
agreeally a worrying animal-that he always has been anxious and
~=ys will be. What then-we may ask-makes the distinctive
mood of an age?
Krutch believes that what we think is related to what happens,
and that by a continued pessimistic attitude _we gt~d~ ou:selves
d a conviction of coming disaster-and this conVlction ill turn
towar
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b comes synonymous with the disaster itself. Goillg a1ong WI
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we "guide omselves," regardless of the direction ill which _we move,
demonstrate that fate is not the arbitrary ruler of om lives. But
~utch's analysis can be disputed-and would be by Skinner. _It
is e>>perience which creates the mood of an age-tl1e psychologist
would say-and om age of anxiety is the result of two world wars
and an economic depression. This emphasis on cause and effect
clearly illustrates Skinner's deterministic philosophy.
The morass in which we of the mid-twentieth century appear
to be foundering might be attributed to a cultmal lag: man's ingenuity has oub"Un his intelligence. When wisdom and good do
not keep pace with the necessity for them, says Krutch, we have
two alternatives: we can simplify, in the manner of Thoreau, by
returning to a political and social order which we would be capable
of managing; or we can "get wise," as was advised by H. G. Wells.
Skinner would elaborate on Wells' contention for wisdom by encouraging the development of a science of human beha~or; thus he
would help decrease the differential between our relatively meager
understanding of people and om encyclopedic knowledge of tech.
.
nology and of the physical world.
Krutch stands firmly in his belief that there IS such a thing
as free will-that man has the ability to recognize good and evil
and to make decisions accordingly-for without this belief we would
be powerless to act at all. "Not sol" our beh~vorist ps~chol~gist
would reply. "When a mao is able to recogniZe that his actions
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are determined by conb:olling factors in his environment, and when
he learns what these factors are, he comes closer to freedom than
does the man who assumes that human behavior is capricious and
unpredictable."
Marx, Freud, and Darwin were all engaged in desb:oying
belief in man's autonomy and in proving that the human is a product
of forces outside his control. Building on the premises that ( 1)
man is an animal, and ( 2) an animal is a machine, their logical
conclusion was that man is a machine. Krutch accuses them of
choosing the mechanical aspect of man because it was the easiest
to study; he states defiantly that this is not the complete answer
to an understanding of mankind. For example, the elecb:onic calculator is as close to having human qualities as a machine can come,
for it can "think." But it is not conscious of itself; it is not capable
of imagination, curiosity, emotion, sympathy; nor can it have preference. These qualities compose what Krutch calls the "universe
of consciousness," which distinguishes man from both animal and
machine.
"Perhaps so," Skinner might say, 'out looking at man as a
machine is a beginning toward a scientific knowledge about him,
and it gives us something practical on which to base our studies.
If we can discover, through experiments with a rat or a dog, useful
principles which are effective in dealing with human beings, why
shouldn't we assume that man has certain mechanical qualities?
We should be thankful for the similarities that exist between animals
and humans!"
Another fear Krutch expresses is that "merely by being treated
as though he could do nothing for himself man is, perhaps, becoming
less capable of doing so." If he can do nothing for himself, will
there be any limits on what may be done to him? Skinner would
answer reassuringly that not only are people constantly being conn·olled by those around them, but they in tum are exercising control over others in various ways. It is a two-way proposition, so
the danger of one person becoming overly-persecuted is relatively
small.
In a chapter entitled "Ignoble Utopias," Krutch gives his evaluation of the Walden Two community-or "institution," as he calls it.
In speaking of Frazier's "scientific ability to control men's thoughts
with precision, thereby causing them to think benevolently and
tolerantly," he points out the horrifying idea that Walden Two is
devoid of thinking individuals! The products of such a conditioning
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would be something less than human.

Frazier-who is the

age~c:J])an for Skinner in the novel-might defend himself with this

P0. :on of the "end-justifies-the-means" rationalization: "When
,·ar: cate people to think benevolently and tolerantly I am merely
I e .u g into immediate practice what theologians and moralists
put!J!lbeen advocating for centw:ies. They may criticize my methods,
bave mine have b r o ugh t results w h e r e theirs have failed."
}~t reinforce his position Skinner might also quote Henry Huxley,
who said:

If some great power would agree to make me always think
what is true and do what is right, on condition of being
turned into a sort of clock and wotmd up every morning
before I got out of bed, I should instantly close with the
offer.

1n his re-examination of our society's value judgments and of
the ultitnate ends we seek to attain, Krutch criticizes Skinner's definition of the "good life" -that which connibutes to the health of
the individual and the long-continued smvival of the society-by
asking, "smvival for what?" This proves a difficult question for me
to answer on Skinner's behalf, and I can only guess at his possible
reply: "'T he Walden Two society should smvive to produce great
works of rut, literatme, and music." At least its residents had plenty
of leisure to devote to such pastimes-tl1ough I question whether
leisure is tl1e only condition conducive to outstanding creativity.
Shouldn't we reverse the situation, however, and ask the theologians,
philosophers, and artists, "What do you wish to smvive for? What
basically ru·e you trying to do?" When we consider carefully their
ultimate goals, we are apt to admit that most of them are striving
to end man's inhumanity to man, to devise a way for people to live
together comfmtably and enjoy the wonders of God's world. Even
the satirists and natmalists in literatme, for example, pmsue these
same ends when they point up the worst in life so that people will
strive for, and appreciate the best . In the light of this argument,
kinner could say that in the Walden Two community he has already achieved the goals which make the smvival of a society
worth while.
In my opinion, one of Krutch's strongest arguments against
the environmental determinists is that they are so dogmatic-they
take the "nothing but" attitude that man is the product of the
economic, sociological, and psychological factors in his past history
and can therefore have no autonomous powers. While Krutch has
devised a minimal definition of a man, the behavorists have taken
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the maximal view. Admitting that we are far from being
autonomous, Krutch at the same time denies that we are
powerless to control our own behavior. The "Minimal Man,"
is even sometimes capable of independent choices-even if they
nothing more than tastes or preferences-is not completely the
of environment. His reasoning is something more than mere
alization. He is both an individual and part of an aggregate.
an individual he can exercise free will but as part of a group
behavior is primarily determined. In short, Krutch is saying,
must be aware of the extent to which one is free." Skinner
say, "One must be aware of the extent to which one is
These men represent two poles of the magnet we see as
will. Krutch stands as a positive force, Skinner as a negative.
of us may choose either pole we prefer. The choice itself gives
couragement to the believer in autonomous man. On the
hand, the person making the decision b1istles with positive or
tive ions he has acquired tlu·ough his living with others-ions
will ultimately determine the direction of his attraction.

